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COMMENT

ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW:

THE SUPREME COURT DODGES

THE RACE BULLET IN FOURTH AMENDMENT TERRY
STOPS
INTRODUCTION

This comment analyzes the Supreme Court case Illinois v.
Wardlow, which applies the reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops initially established in Terry v. Ohio.2 Although the decisions are separated by more than thirty years, during which the Court has4
3
had the benefit of jurisprudential discourse and social science research
1. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
2.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3.
See, e.g., Honorable Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State ConstitutionalAnalysis of
Pretext Stops: Racial Profilingand Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 617-18 (1999)
("Whether the impact of racial profiling is real or perceived, damaging or benign, underreported or
overblown, it remains a public policy concern that must be confronted, both in the federal and state
courts ...
state courts must recognize that resolution of the problem in the context of equal protection
may only be theoretical. Furthermore, even if the matter can be addressed under the Equal Protection
Clause, a resolution may be neither swift nor effective."); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in "Stop-and-Frisk":
Stereotypical Beliefs Linger, But How Far Can The Police Go?, 72-APR N.Y. ST. B. J. 42, 44
(2000) ("courts should take a very hard look at the government's justification for its actions. There is
no place in constitutional law or criminal justice for a theory of "reasonable" racial discrimination.");
David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics,and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84
MINN. L. REV. 265, 325 (1999) ("we must strive to avoid police practices that impose high costs on
law abiding citizens, and that skew those costs heavily on the basis of race"); David A. Harris,
ParticularizedSuspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court
Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 1023 (1998) ("Courts must consider the
facts in each case, not simple assertions that any time a person is suspected of crime X, they are
always likely to be armed. Using categorical judgments robs Terry of its legitimacy. Without such a
correction, Terry will continue to become what the Supreme Court still says it is not--pure and
simple, a device for stopping people about whom officers have a hunch, perhaps with a racial cast,
and searching them for evidence. And at that point, we will be right back where we started--in 1960,
before Mapp, in the time of 'giving 'em a toss."').
4.
See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 984 (1999) (discussing that the "five essential goals of human organization" will often lead to biased or discriminatory opinions about race). In notes 152, 160, and 167,
Thompson cites additional social science approaches to this issue. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK &
JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 99 (1993) ("recounting story of black man stopped by police while strolling in white neighborhood because he was
'incongruous in [his] surroundings' and thus suspicious"); SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, A
CATEGORIZATION APPROACH TO STEREOTYPING, IN COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND

INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR, 83, 84-86 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981); Birt L. Duncan, Differential
Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping
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concerning the impact of race on investigative stops, the Court has refused to change how it analyzes such stops justified by reasonable suspicion. Simply stated, the majority of the Court has not reflected on how
race can undermine the reasonable suspicion standard in Terry stops despite evidence that it can be a substantial, albeit an often hidden, reason
for the stop. Race can affect Terry stops by both influencing how a detainee reacts to the police and contributing to the reason why the police
decide to make the stop.5
Because of the Court's reticence to discuss how race could factor
into an officer's judgment when observing a suspect, it is not surprising
that the outcomes of Wardlow and Terry are similar. In fact, the Court
has effectively precluded Fourth Amendment relief for police action influenced by race. Whren v. United States6 held that "the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.",7 A remedy
sought under the Equal Protection Clause, however, presents practically
insurmountable obstacles to a minority who has been improperly detained. For an equal protection claim, a suspect must show that "the law
enforcement policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose." 8 As one commentator stated, "short of an
admission by the police officer or similarly incriminating physical evidence, a [detainee cannot] prove that race served as the only reason or
the primary reason for the stop." 9
While the Court has practically foreclosed minorities from alleging
racial bias in Terry stops, distrust of the police by inner city, minority
populations has only seemed to increase. A training model developed for
social workers illustrates this point well.1° In the model, individuals are
audibly presented four scenarios and asked to arrange them in the order
in which they occurred." The first scenario depicts a man climbing out
of a window. 12 The second picture includes the same man running down
of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595-97 (1976) ("discussing psychological
research revealing common stereotype that blacks are prone to violence").
5. The Wardlow dissent recognizes the first of these propositions. As Justice Stevens stated,
the "accepted axiom of criminal law that 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous
are as bold as a lion' is inaccurate in light of current tensions between the police and minorities who
reside in high crime areas. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
8. Davis, supra note 3, at 437.
9. Id.
10.
See LARRY WRIGHT & CHARMAINE R. BRtTTAIN, SPECIALIZED INTERVIEWING SKILLS
FOR CHILD WELFARE WORKERS, U. DENV. CHILD WELFARE TRAINING AND RESEARCH PROJECT, 13

(2000).
11.
12.

See id.
See id.
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a street.1 3 The third picture depicts the man before a judge, and in the
fourth picture, he is in jail. 14 Results have shown that a white respondent15
will often order the sequences as they are presented, one through four.
The rationale behind this sequential ordering is that the man was doing
something wrong when he climbed out of the window and likely ran to
avoid police officers who were legitimately in pursuit. 16 The man was
then arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for the crime he committed. 7
At the same time, results have also shown that a person of color
would often sequence the scenarios differently. 18 A common response
was to start with the man in jail. 19 He was in jail because the police pursued him and took him to court. 20 The police chased him because he was
running down the street, and to justify the stop, the police later said the
man was breaking into a house. E This training tool starkly illustrates the
strained relations between minorities and law enforcement, arguably
22
created in large part by improper racial considerations in Terry stops.
Although these studies tend to show that race is a factor that can contribute to both the reaction of the detainee to a police officer and to a police
officer's suspicion in making a stop, the Court refuses to consider it in
this context. Admittedly, including race in a Fourth Amendment analysis
would be difficult for a court. This difficulty should not, however, preclude race from being included in a reasonable suspicion determination
under the Fourth Amendment.

13.

See id.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
WRIGHT, supra note 10.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 680 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Johnson, Americans' View on Crime and Law Enforcement: Survey Findings, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE JOURNAL 13 (Sept.1997) (reporting that "43% of African-Americans consider 'police
brutality and harassment of African-Americans a serious problem' in their own community"); Casimir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, MAR. 26, 1999, p. 34 ("informal
survey of 100 young black and Hispanic men living in New York City; 81 reported having been
stopped and frisked by police at least once; none of the 81 stops resulted in arrests."); see also
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 n.8 (citing Alex Kotlowitz, Hidden CasualtiesL Drug War's Emphasis
on Law Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1991, at A2 ("'Black leaders complained that innocent people were picked up in the drug sweeps .... ' Many stops never lead to an
arrest, which further exacerbates the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and
people living in high crime areas.")); Id. at 681 n.9 ("the Chief of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police department, for example, confirmed that 'sizeable percentages of Americans today especially Americans of color - still view policing in the United States to be discriminatory, if not by
policy and definition, certainly in its day-to-day application.").
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Part I of this comment is a brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment, the historical Terry decision, and the more recent search and seizure case Whren v. United States.23 The reader will note that prior to
Whren, the topic of race is noticeably absent from this section, and for
good reason: the Court does not address race in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. Part II presents the reasoning of the Court in Wardlow, and
discusses the part concurrence and part dissent by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Part III is a critical analysis of Wardlow,
in which the Court adheres to the Whren holding and refuses to consider
race in its Fourth Amendment analysis. This article maintains that by
applying an analysis similar to the totality of the circumstances test as
suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent, courts can effectively consider race more explicitly. Finally, Part IV concludes that until courts
consider race as a pertinent factor in Fourth Amendment analysis, the
government will continue to prevail on the majority of the claims that
24
contest frivolous stops based on the lenient Terry standard.
I.BACKGROUND

A.

The Reasonableness Clause and the FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to
25
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Historically, momentum in support of the Fourth Amendment
stemmed from the use of writs of assistance in the colonies before the
26
American Revolution. The writs were a prevailing legal practice in
England that authorized the British "examination of suspected ships and
vessels, vaults, cellars, warehouses or other places in which might be

23. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) (in which the Court considered "whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a
reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic
laws.").
24.

See George C. Thomas Il, Terry v. Ohio in the Trenches: A Glimpse at How Courts

Apply "Reasonable Suspicion ",72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1998) (addressing a random
sample of criminal cases involving reasonable suspicion and determining that the government prevails 72% of these cases).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26.

See EDWARD C. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 (1970).
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found smuggled
goods or those on which the required duties had not
S,,27
been paid.
These warrants, oftentimes exercised with discretion, significantly contributed to colonist dissatisfaction that culminated in the
28
Revolutionary War. In drafting the Bill of Rights, enacted in 1789, the
republic's founders intended in part to ensure that private citizens would
be free from this or any other kind of unwarranted governmental intru29
sion.
No statutes exist to guide judges and juries through the process of
deciding whether law enforcement officers obtained information in compliance with a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.3 ° Instead, the Fourth
Amendment itself is the "ultimate yardstick," and judges must turn to the
court's prior decisions that interpret it. 3 1 Like much of the language of
the Constitution, the "unreasonable search and seizure" clause is a vague
term that courts have interpreted differently, and "[t]here is no mathematical test for determining reasonableness other than balancing the need
to arrest or search against the invasion that is entailed."3 2
To further complicate a court's analysis of Fourth Amendment violations, a judicially created doctrine known as the exclusionary rule prevents a court from considering evidence if the evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 33 Commentators have criticized the
doctrine because it is not included in the language of the Amendment,
and at one point the Supreme Court nearly repudiated it in Adams v. New
York. 34 The rule was reaffirmed soon after the Adams decision,
however, 35 and it continues to be a method to exclude evidence, regard-

27.
28.

Id.

29.

See J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 1 (1979).
See WADDINGTON, supra note 28, at 1.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See LAWRENCE C. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE

1 (1974).

Id.
id. at 8.
See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING

(2000 ed.).
34.
192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904).
35. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914) ("The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of
crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the
latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which
are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights ... The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
SUPREME COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 55
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less of the evidence's relevance or materiality.36 Chief Justice Warren
explained the policy rationale of the exclusionary rule in Terry, stating
that it "has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless
police conduct." 37 Additionally, "without [the rule] the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere
'form of words.' ' 38 Thus, reinforced by the judicial acceptance of the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment guarantees private citizens a
right to privacy against unreasonable or unwarranted actions by government officers.39
B.

A Precursorto Terry

Every state has its own constitutional provision relating to search
and seizure that provides the same guarantee discussed above.4 Nearly
twenty years before deciding Terry, the Supreme Court determined that
search and seizure provisions apply to actions of state law enforcement
officials as well as federal officers. 41 In Wolf v. Colorado,42 the Court
held that although "the Fourth Amendment did not per se apply to state
action, nevertheless search and seizure is a matter implicit in the modem
concept of due process of law, guaranteed to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment ....
,,43
The Court reasoned that
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in ,the concept of ordered liberty"
and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prel-

the sacrifice of those great principles established be [sic] years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.").
36.
See WADDINGTON, supra note 28, at 3; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
210 (1960). "To the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States there has been unquestioning adherence for now almost half a century." Id. (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)).
37.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 39193 (1914)).
38.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
39.
40.
41.
42.

See
See
See
338

FISHER, supra note 26, at 1I.
id. at 8.
id. at 9.
U.S. 25 (1949).

43.
FISHER, supra note 26, at 9. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part:
"No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... U.S. CONST.
.
amend. XIV, § I.

2000]

ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW

ude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority
of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacz it would
run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After extending the protection of constitutional provisions in cases
involving state as well as federal action, the Court was confronted with
issues of warrantless searches and seizures. In Beck v. Ohio, 45 the peti46
tioner (Beck) was driving when he was stopped by police officers.
Without a search warrant or an arrest warrant, the officers arrested Beck
47
and searched his car. Finding nothing, the officers took him to the po48
lice station and searched him. They found some clearing house slips in
an envelope that Beck had tucked into his sock.4 9 He was charged with
possession of the slips in violation of a state criminal statute.5 °
Beck argued that the evidence should have been excluded because
the police had obtained it through an unreasonable search and seizure
that violated his constitutional rights. 5 1 The trial court overruled the motion to suppress, and both the Ohio
of Appeals and the Ohio SuS. Court
52
preme Court affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the arresting officers had probable cause to
conduct the arrest, and whether a warrantless arrest was constitutionally
valid.5 3 Upon review, the Court concluded that Beck's arrest could not
"be squared with the demands of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ,54

44.
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
45. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
46. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 89-90.
47. See id. at 90.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. (charging Beck for possession of "numbers game" ticket in violation of a statute
that stated: "No person shall own, possess, have on or about his person, have in his custody, or have
under his control a ticket, order, or device for or representing a number of shares or an interest in a
scheme of chance known as 'policy,' 'numbers game,' 'clearing house,' or by words or terms of
similar import, located in or to be drawn, paid, or carried on within or without this state." OHIo REV.
CODE, § 2915.111 (Anderson 1972)).
51.
See Beck, 379 U.S. at 90.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 90-91.
54. Id. at 93.
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In its analysis, the Court noted that the trial court was informed of
two facts: "the officers knew what the petitioner looked like and knew
that he had a previous record of arrests ....

[b]ut to hold knowledge of

either or both of these facts constituted probable cause would be to hold
that anyone with a previous criminal record could be arrested at will."55
Furthermore, the Court warned of the dangers of a warrantless arrest,
stating that "[a]n arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes
instead the far less reliable procedure on an after-the-event justification
the familiar
for the arrest or search, too likely to ' be
56 subtly influenced by
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.
Probable cause, the court noted, "is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating ... often opposing interests, 57 because to require more of officers would "unduly hamper" their efforts.58 At the same time, requiring
less would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim
or caprice. 59 Pursuant to the probable cause standard, although the officers may well have acted on good faith in stopping and arresting the peenough." 60
titioner, "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not
If good faith was the applicable test, the Court concluded that "the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in
the discretion of the police.,,6 1 Accordingly, Beck prevailed on his claim
that his rights had been violated because officers had unjustifiably intruded into his car and person.
C.

The Reasonable, Articulable-SuspicionStandardof Terry

In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court established that reasonable suspicion, a standard short of probable cause, was enough to justify a police
62
stop and investigation. Terry addressed the Fourth Amendment's role
in confrontations between law enforcement and private citizens.63 In
Terry, a plainclothes policeman with 39 years of experience observed
two men on a street corner. 64 Though the officer was unable to articulate
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 91 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).

58.

id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 97 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)).

61.

Id.

62.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

63.
64.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.
See id. at 5.
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what exactly aroused his suspicion, he stated at trial that "when I looked
over they didn't look right to me at the time. '65 He proceeded to observe
one of the men walk past a store window and peer in, then walk back to
the corner. 66 After a brief conference, the second man walked past the
window, peered in, and returned. 67 They repeated these actions five or
68
six times each and met up with a third man. The officer suspected69the
men were "casing a job, a stick-up," and that "they may have a gun.",
After this surveillance, the officer approached them, identified himself as an officer, and when he did not recognize them he asked their
names.70 After a mumbled response, the officer grabbed Terry, spun him
in the direction of his associates, and frisked the outside of Terry's
clothing. 7' During the stop, the officer felt and removed handguns from
two of the three men and arrested all three. 72 The police charged both
Terry and his associate with carrying concealed weapons.73 The officer
later testified that he had not placed his hands
beneath either defendant's
74
clothing until he felt the contours of a gun.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the admissibility of the guns violated Terry's Fourth Amendment rights.75
Chief Justice Warren noted the importance of protecting personal liberties by citing Union PacificRailroad Company v. Botsford7 6 to state that
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded.., than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."77
The Court first discussed the "stop and frisk" rule.78 Under suspicion that an individual may be connected with criminal activity, the
Court supported the principle that the police can stop that individual and
detain him or her briefly to determine if that person might be armed.7 9
The minor inconvenience or embarrassment to the suspect is outweighed

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71
72
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

id.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 10.
See id.
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and safe law enby the competing societal interest to facilitate effective
8
0
suspicions.
their
on
act
who
officers
by
forcement
The Court introduced the argument that the stop and frisk rule is a
"substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police officers whose judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in 'the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ' ' 81 The
court noted petitioner's argument that such a rule would only intensify
tense relations between the police and inner-city urban communities and
stop citizens to
perpetuate a sense of distrust and invasion when officers
82
determine whether they should investigate further.
The Court questioned whether the officer "seized" defendant Terry
and whether the officer conducted a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 83 The Chief Justice rejected the argument that a stop
and frisk was not the same as a search and seizure:
[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapperson's clothing all 84
"search.
a
not
is
ons
Thus, the Court determined that "the Fourth Amendment governs all
intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security ....
The Court then turned to analyze whether the officer's search and
seizure "was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place. ' ' 86 Justification, pursuant to the language of the Fourth
Amendment, requires probable cause. Yet the Court pointed to a reasonableness standard and stated that an officer must be able to cite "specific
and articulable facts" which "reasonably warrant [an] intrusion. 87 Justified by the governmental interest in safe neighborhoods and effective
crime prevention, the Court concluded that a police officer was justified

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 10-11.
Id. at 12 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 19 n.15.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
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to investigate ossible criminal activity even though he or she lacks
probable cause.
In deference to the safety of law enforcement, the Court inserted a
reasonable suspicion test in lieu of the probable cause standard of the
Fourth Amendment:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be 89warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger.
The Court concluded that the gun seized from Terry was admissible
based on the arresting officer's experience. 90 The officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that Terry was armed because of observable, unusual
behavior. 9' It was necessary for the officer to protect himself and the
92
community to take action to discover whether a crime was afoot. Furthermore, the search was restricted to the items the officer expected to
find. 93 Such a search was reasonable, and according to the Court, it fell
within the guidelines of the Fourth Amendment. 94
As Justice White explained in Alabama v. White, 9' over twenty years
after the Terry decision, reasonable suspicion is a different standard than
probable cause:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than
that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that
that is less reliable
reasonable suspicion can arise from information
96
than that required to show probable cause.
Thus, when it embraced the reasonable suspicion standard instead of
probable cause as stated in the Fourth Amendment, the Terry Court sub88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 27.
See id
See id. at 28.
See id at 30.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Seeid at 31.
496 U.S. 325 (1990).
White, 496 U.S. at 330.
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stantially lowered the degree of suspicion required for police officers to
stop and search a citizen.
The Terry decision also established a reticence by courts to present
the facts of cases without any mention of race. 98 This was challenged by
Whren v. United States,99 in which police officers pulled over and arrested two men who aroused suspicion with a variety of factors: they
were young, the car had temporary plates, the driver was looking into the
passenger's lap, and after seeing the officers, they turned quickly and
sped away.1°° When the officers approached the car, one officer observed
what looked like bags of drugs through the window. 0 1 Though the Court
omitted defendant's race from the statement of facts, initially describing
them as "youthful,"' 0 2 defendants were eventually revealed by the Court
to be black, but only when the Court rejected the argument that race
should3 be relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of the case at
0
1

bar.

The Whren Court determined that defendant's admission that he
committed a traffic violation furnished the requisite probable cause.104
The appeal under the Fourth Amendment was misguided because "the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis. ' 1°5 In other words, the Court would not consider
racial motivations as factors to challenge the legitimacy of the probable
cause to necessitate a stop and frisk or a search and seizure.
Thus, the Whren decision essentially precluded illicit racial motivation from being relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 1°6 As discussed
below, the Terry rule is still adhered to today, and pursuant to Whren,
race continues to be a non-issue in a Fourth Amendment analysis of investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion.

97.
See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Marvel or Mischief? Terry
v. Ohio: A PracticallyPerfectDoctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 911,926 (1998).
98.
See Thompson, supra note 4, at 978 (discussing a challenge to the constitutionality of a
spot check of motorists without probable cause in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits using deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing citizen in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
99. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
100. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
101.
See id. at 808-09.
102. Id. at 808.
103. See id. at 810-13.
104. See id. at 810.
105. Id. at 813.
106. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 981.
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II. TERRY'S LEGACY IN ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW

07

On September 9, 1995, shortly after noon, a four-car caravan of
police officers drove
S 108 through an area well known for crime, including
While driving, uniformed officer Nolan observed
drug transactions.
Wardlow standing next to a building, holding a bag. 09 When Wardlow
saw the officers drive toward him, he turned and ran." 0 Suspicious of
Wardlow's flight, Officer Nolan and his partner pursued and eventually
stopped Wardlow."' An experienced officer, Nolan knew from practice
that weapons were frequently found in the presence of drug transactions,
and accordingly, Nolan frisked Wardlow. During the pat down, Nolan
felt a heavy object in the shape of a gun in Wardlow's bag. 1 34 Nolan
"
opened the bag, found a loaded handgun, and arrested Wardlow.
Wardlow filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun because
Officer Nolan did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop
him.115 The Illinois trial court denied the motion and convicted Wardlow
for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. 16 The Illinois Appellate Court
agreed with Wardlow that Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk and overturned the conviction." 7 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. 1 8 The
19
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.'
The Court analyzed Wardlow based on a standard first applied in
Terry.1 20 The Terry rule requires "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot... [and] [w]hile 'reasonable suspicion' is a less
demanding standard than probable cause,"' 21 the officer must rely on
more than a vague, unjustified suspicion or simply a gut-feeling about
criminal activity. 22 The Wardlow Court held that the officers' stop and
protective frisk did not violate the Fourth Amendment.123

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115,
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

120 S.Ct. 673
See Wardlow,
See id. at 675.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Wardlow,
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Wardlow,
Id.
See id. at 676.
See id. at 674.

(2000).
120 S. Ct. at 674.

120 S.Ct. at 675.

120 S.Ct. at 675.
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The Court initially noted that Wardlow's presence in a high crime
area was not enough to support the requisite reasonable suspicion, for it
was just one of the "relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." The Court also cited several cases that suggest nervous behavior
can be an additional contributing factor to determine reasonable suspicion.125 The Court characterized defendant's flight from police as nervous conduct, 126 but noted that citizens are free to conduct their business
and ignore a police officer who approaches without reasonable
suspicion. 127 A citizen's refusal to cooperate does not give an investigating officer the justification to stop and search. 28 Yet according to the
Court's interpretation of the facts, Wardlow did not merely avoid the
officers and continue about his business - instead, he fled. 12 While flight
itself is not indicative of illegal behavior, it is, as the Court stated, "the
consummate act of evasion... [and] certainly suggestive of [wrongdoing]. 13 °
The Court also reasoned that it would be impossible to police effectively if "scientific certainty" 131 was required of law enforcement in order
to stop someone. Simply stated, such certainty will never exist. Thus,
the Court concluded, reasonable suspicion must be based on "commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. ' ,1 32 In light of
that standard, the Court held that Officer Nolan was justified in his suspicion that Wardlow was
involved in illegal activity, and further investi1 33
gation was legitimate.
A. Justice Stevens' Dissent: Per Se Rules, Race, and the "Totality-ofThe-Circumstances Test"
In his dissent, Justice Stevens began by commending the Court for
rejecting requests by petitioner and respondent for "per se rules. 134 The
State of Illinois requested a rule to authorize "the temporary detention of
anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. 1 35 Respondent

124. Id. at 676.
125.
See id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)).
126. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129
See id.
130. Id.
131.
Id.
132. Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (198 1)).
133. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675.
134. Id. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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asked for an opposite rule that a person who flees from law enforcement
136
cannot on its face be enough to justify a Terry stop. Justice Stevens
raised the issue of what reasonable conclusions about a person's behavior
could be drawn from one who flees. 37 There are a variety of reasons for
flight, some evasive and criminally motivated, others legitimate and law
abiding. 38 Because of these various reasons, a bright-line rule would be
unworkable. 139
Instead of a per se rule, Justice Stevens reasoned that inferences
about motivation for flight could be drawn from several circumstances,
including "the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the
runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the
person's behavior was otherwise unusual. ' 4 The dissent then turned to a
factor not discussed by the majority: race.141
Justice Stevens recognized that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that some citizens, especially minorities who live in low-income
areas, may have good reason to distrust the police.142 When any contact
with the police can be considered dangerous, "unprovoked flight is neither 'aberrant' nor 'abnormal. ' "1 43 Evidence explaining minority skepticism of police is "too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and
too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient."' 44 In
other words, statistics from social science studies of strained relations
between police and minorities could contribute to a "commonsense con'145
clusion... that unprovoked flight can occur for.., innocent reasons."
Because Justice Stevens finds this type of evidence credible, his approach is inherently subjective since people will often respond to encounters with law enforcement differently. Accordingly, Justice Stevens
seems to suggest that on a case-by-case basis, courts could consider the
subjective, personal perceptions and responses of individuals whose
seemingly suspicious behavior to police officers might be either practical
and sensible or indicative of wrongdoing. Thus, because reasons for

136. See id.
137. See id. at 678.
138. See id. at 678-79 (listing with good humor a variety of circumstances in which a reasonable person would run, including "to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for
rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature - any of which
might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity").
139. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 679.
140.
141.

Id.
See id. at 680.

142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 681.
See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 682.
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flight can be legitimate, only a consideration of the totality of the circumstances will determine the proper result."'
Applying the "totality-of-the-circumstances test"' 47 to the facts,
Justice Stevens concluded the State did not meet its burden of articulating facts to support reasonable suspicion.148 He did so, however, without
addressing race further. Instead, the dissent noted the absence of several
facts from the record that could have contributed to the reasonable suspicion analysis. 149 Officer Nolan was not asked whether the other officers
were in uniform, or how fast the police cars were driving. 50 Nor did the
record indicate whether Wardlow noticed the other police cars or how
much of the caravan had passed before he started to run. 5' The only
factor that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion was the officer's52
statement that Wardlow "looked in our direction and began fleeing."'
The simple fact that Wardlow was carrying a bag in a high crime area did
not incriminate him. 53 Similar to unprovoked flight, "presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry." 54 Thus, the dissent
concluded, the Court relied on an insufficient
series of facts to conclude
55
that Officer Nolan's stop was justified.

III. ANALYSIS
Although the four-justice Wardlow dissent recognized that race
could be considered subjectively in a reasonable suspicion Terry stop,
this article suggests the analysis should go one step further. If there is
already substantial support on the Court, represented by the four-justice
dissent, to consider how a person's preconceived notions can contribute
to an outwardly suspicious response to the police, why should courts not
also consider the racial biases of police officers who make the stops?
There is little difference between the former and the latter; simply because the race issue is politicized does not mean it should be avoided.
Though Justice Stevens' dissent rightly noted that minorities often distrust police enough to modify behavior, he did not suggest that race can

146.
147.
148
149.

See id. at 682.
See id.
See id. at 684.
See id. at 683-84.

150

See id.

151.
152

See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 684.
Id.

153.

See id.

154.
155.

Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 684.
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and should be a factor separately discussed by courts to assess the legitimacy of reasonable suspicion. This article takes that position.
Ironically, some courts already recognize that reasonable suspicion
should be based on the totality of the circumstances. For example, United
States v. Cortez156 held that a flexible standard, including certain mental
inferences and judgments by trained officers, could be used to substantiate reasonable suspicion.157 Also surprisingly, courts have previously
considered race as a factor to permit officers to detain suspects.158 Thus,
because courts are already allowing officers the discretion to consider
race objectively in order to detain a suspect, there is little justifiable reason why an examination of an officer's subjective motivations concerning race should be disallowed in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
In such analyses, though Whren holds otherwise, courts should explicitly
consider race in the contexts of how the character of the neighborhood
affects the reactions of a detainee to police as well as how it influences a
police officer's judgment in stopping an individual.
A. The Characterof the Neighborhoodand Subjective Views of
Detainee
As demonstrated by Wardlow, courts already consider character of
the neighborhood evidence in a reasonable suspicion analysis; they do
so, however, in a limited context that prejudices the detainee. Courts
should make a shift from allowing officers to consider the character of a
neighborhood as a pretext to a stop to considering how citizens in a
neighborhood see and react to the police. The former is an objective determination based on the following question: is the area known for un156.
157.

449 U.S. 411 (1981).
See id. at 418.
We have recently held that stops by the Border Patrol may be justified
under circumstances less than those constituting probable cause for arrest or search. Thus, the test is not whether Officers Gray and Evans had
probable cause... Rather the question is whether, based upon the whole
picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably
surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal
activity. On this record, they could so conclude.

Id. at 421-22 (internal citation omitted).
158. See Davis, supra note 3, at 429 nn.28-9 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 563-64 (1976) (holding that border patrol agents detaining travelers based on Mexican ancestry
was not a constitutional violation); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975)
(concluding that border patrol officers can consider the race of a suspect as a factor to justify a stop);
United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394-96 (8th Cir. 1992) (justifying the detention of a black
man in an airport and holding that race, when coupled with other factors, is a basis for reasonable
suspicion); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (concluding that the ethnicity of a suspect
can be considered when that individual seems "out of place" in a neighborhood); State v. Ruiz, 504
P.2d 1307, 1307-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the police were correct to consider race
when they stopped a Mexican in a predominantly black area)).
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lawful activity? This can be determined by data amassed by local governments and police stations. The latter is a subjective approach: why did
this individual act suspiciously in the presence of the police? As stated in
the Wardlow dissent, either legitimate or unlawful motivations might
cause an individual to flee or act outwardly guilty. Moreover, according
to Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, distrust of law enforcement based on personal experience can be considered in the totalityof-the-circumstances test.
Presently, the courts allow the character of the neighborhood to be
considered as a contributing factor to intensify an officer's suspicion.
While some courts have already considered the ramifications of suspicion based on a suspect deemed out of place in a particular neighborhood, 159 courts must devise a way to prevent the risk that everyone in a
poor neighborhood is "stop-eligible." 60 One way to do so is to carefully
limit the use of the character of a neighborhood in this particular context.
The Supreme Court has already held that the neighborhood alone cannot
constitute reasonable suspicion.16 Beyond this standard, however, courts
inconsistently address how a questionable neighborhood contributes to
justifying an officer's reasonable suspicion. Some courts have concluded
that "a single observation of ambiguous conduct is sufficient

. . .

when

coupled with a claim that criminal activity is prevalent in the surrounding
neighborhood,"' 162 while others have not. Similar behaviors in highcrime neighborhoods will often lead to different results, even though
163
jurisdictions apply the same standard.
It is obvious, however, that character of a neighborhood should be a
factor to a police officer's assessment of suspicion. Quantitatively, a person in a bad neighborhood is more likely to be engaged in criminal activity.164 Yet a wrongdoer will never be accurately identified every time
by even the most astute of law enforcement officers, because there will
always be law-abiding citizens in the worst neighborhoods. 65 Consequently, the use of character of the neighborhood in this context should
be carefully limited.
To more effectively assess the role of neighborhood character, courts
and police should consider the surroundings only when an actor's be159.
See State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068, 1074-75 (holding that a person who appears racially
out of place in a neighborhood can never constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal
behavior).
160.

Margaret Raymond, Down on the Comer, Out in the Street. Consideringthe Characterof

the Ne'ghborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 99-101 (1999).

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 112 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
Id. at 116.
See id. at 122.
See id. at 125.
See id.
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havior is not common among law-abiding citizens of that neighborhood
at the time and location where the actor is observed. 166 If observable behavior does not distinguish the suspect from other community members,
the investigating officer must not pursue the suspect. This approach
would insulate law abiders in a community whose cultural distrust of law
enforcement officers prevails. Manifestations of this distrust or fear
could never result in a stop unless the behavior is unusual in light of lawabiding, albeit police-wary, citizens in the area. Only then can the officer
consider the character of the neighborhood as part of the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion is legitimate. 167
B. Thinking About Race and Subjective Views of Officers
Just as courts should subjectively consider the character of a neighborhood as it reflects on the reaction of detainees, courts should look
more carefully at how police officers intuitively approach suspects. One
way to do so would be to address the influence of social science research
and cognitive psychology, which some legal scholars have suggested can
help courts understand how the human mind understands conduct and
draws on cultural understandings to evaluate behavior.' 68 According to
current cognitive research, people group information into organizational
categories or schemas that are easier to understand. A discussion of
schema "tries to explain how we store our knowledge, how we learn and
how we remember what we have learned."' 169 In other words, an activation of mental files will assist an individual's comprehension of a familiar event. This connection of the new to the known may be either a conscious choice or without any awareness by the individual.
Within this process of categorization comes stereotyping, which
leads to prejudgments based on understandings of categorical behavior.
Though a sudden identification of a person's characteristics based on
166. See id. at 127.
167. See id. at 128. This approach does not, however, leave room for stopping individuals in
neighborhoods simply because it is not common to find them in those neighborhoods. See St. Paul
v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (examining the constitutional validity of "profile
stops"). This court addressed whether an officer was justified to stop a vehicle registered to a suburb
approximately 20 miles from the scene, simply because it was late at night and it was unusual to find
a car with the address in the area. See id. at 624. The driver committed no traffic violations. See id.
The court concluded the driver's fourth amendment rights had been violated. See id. at 629. Behavior is at issue, not appearance; race alone is never enough to justify a stop. Accordingly, a white
man driving in a black neighborhood cannot be stopped absent an officer's reasonable suspicion that
extends beyond an observation that the individual looks out of place. Assuming the man drives in a
manner consistent with other law-abiding citizens of the neighborhood, a stop is both unnecessary
and unwarranted. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded in Uber, "[t]here simply needs to
be something more than driving your own car in a proper and legitimate manner on the public streets
of a town 'other than the one you live in' before the authorities can stop citizens." See iL at 628.
168. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 983-84.
169.

ELLIN OLIVER KEENE & SUSAN ZIMMERMANN, MOSAIC OF THOUGHT 50 (1997).
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age, sex, race, nationality, or occupation is not always accurate, it is oftentimes on what individuals base their judgments. 17 For example, if a
police officer has a disproportionate number of encounters with men of
color, an interaction with a Hispanic man will activate an officer's
schema that Hispanic men are more likely to commit crimes, and the
man before him will appear more suspicious.
Not surprisingly, stereotyping can play an integral role in a police officer's work, because officers are expected to investigate unusual behavior. 17 1 Mental categorization helps define what an officer sees, and
personal biases can dictate judgments and behavior. That is, although an
officer may not have control over unconsciously concluding that a Hispanic man standing on a comer looks suspicious, it nevertheless can be
the controlling factor when that officer decides the person is suspicious
enough to warrant a stop.172
The courts and society in general may be legitimately uncomfortable
with the concept that racial biases not only exist, but can be attributed to
learned understandings that result from cognitive sorting. These biases
may not be outwardly malicious, but they can have a profound impact. A
police officer who has unconsciously, or perhaps consciously, learned to
differentiate between whites and non-whites with respect to the probability of criminal activity might very well suspect a non-white actor on a
street comer over a white on the same street comer, simply because of
race.
Contrary to the holding of Terry, race is an undeniable factor in
Fourth Amendment stop and frisks, and equal protection should not be
the sole remedy for Fourteenth Amendment questions considering race.
Accordingly, courts should determine how race influenced a police officer's judgment and analyze how the officer approached the suspect
through a social science lens. Though this science is far from perfect, and
many courts would be reluctant to confront an officer's racial biases, an
exploration of that officer's stereotypes could reveal whether the suspect
was stopped for legitimate or racially motivated reasons. Clearly, the
impact of race needs to be considered in the Terry reasonable suspicion
analysis that is supposedly based73 on "commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.'

170.
171.
172.
173.
411,418

See Thompson, supra note 4, at 985.
See id. at 987.
See id.
Wardlow v. Illinois, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (1999) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
(1981)).
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C. Considering Subjective Objective-A PsycholegalApproach
As stated above, the legal system tends to view social science contributions to the courtroom with little confidence. This reticence by courts
to embrace a "psycholegal"' 174 approach is summarized by Justice Black,
who questioned, "[h]ow long will trials be delayed while judges turn
psychologists to probe the subconscious minds of witnesses?"' 7 In Missouri v. Jenkins,176 Justice Thomas reasoned that evidence presented by
studies of social behavior was "unnecessary and misleading."' 177 Research findings are often determined "malleable and unreliable, not reflective of the reality and complexity of the real world. 1 78 Furthermore,
there is a paradoxical relationship between research produced by social
scientists and common sense employed by lawyers and courts. "When
research refutes common-sense psychology, it is often dismissed as invalid. When the research supports common-sense psychology, it is often
179
dismissed as unnecessary because it merely confirms common sense."'
Courts typically employ a common sense approach to analyze and
explain conduct. As the majority reasoned in Wardlow, "the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments
and inferences about human behavior."'1 80 The Whren Court also observed the objective method of analysis, determining that "the fact that
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken
as long as the circumstances, viewed ob' 81
jectively, justify that action."'
Just as courts are wary of psychological methodology, psychologists
S •• 182
have viewed the common sense approach with equal skepticism. This
objective, reasonable person test to examine an arresting officer's conduct, according to psychological interpretation, borrows from "such unreliable sources as 'the pages of human experience."" 8 3 The problem
174.

Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal

Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107 (1998).
175.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 248 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
176.
515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
177.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121(Thomas, J., concurring).
178.
Redding, supranote 174, at 113.
179.
Id.
180. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
181.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
182.
See Redding, supra note 174, at 113.
183.
Id. at 118 (citing Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations:The Supreme
Court's Reckless Disregardfor Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569,
1594, 1596-97 (1992) (stating that to the Court, common sense is "often is far more persuasive than
data gleaned from methodologically sound research .. .the relationship between law and social
science is less than perfect. 'Like an insensitive scoundrel involved with an attractive but fundamentally irksome lover who too much wants to be courted, the judiciary shamelessly uses the social
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with relying on common sense in a courtroom is that it "lulls us into the
false security of believing that we already understand people," 1 84 while
psychology can "raise[] questions about what we really do understand
,,181
and go[] beyond common-sense formulations.
Writing for the majority in Wardlow, Justice Rehnquist concluded
the Court did not have a precise method to assess the behavior of Officer
Nolan. "[I]n reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct," Justice
Rehnquist resolved, "courts do not have available empirical studies
dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement
officers where none exists. ' 86 Though the proposed "subjective objectives" approach cannot provide a court with absolute certainty of an officer's justification or wrongdoing, the benefits of psycholegal research
and considerations of an officer's subjective intentions could assist
courts in making legal conclusions with more precision.
Whether well received or not, a psychological approach is nothing
new to the courts. Cognitive assessments are frequently made to determine whether defendants are mentally fit to stand trial.18 The psycholegal approach sought by this article simply extends the consideration of
race, as suggested in part by the Wardlow dissent, to help explain the
reactions of the detainee to police as well as the impact that race may
sciences.' Courts cite the results of psychological research when they believe it will enhance the
elegance of their opinions, as in the most oft-cited example of Brown v. Board of Education, but
empiricism is readily discarded when more traditional legally acceptable bases for decisionmaking is
available.").
184.
Redding, supra note 174, at 118. (citing HARVEY C. LINDGREN AND JOHN H. HARVEY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1981)).

185.
Id.
186. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
187.
See generally United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a person
is not responsible for a crime if that person cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of it due to a mental
disease or defect); State v. Green, 643 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (setting aside the defendant's conviction, concluding the State had not met its burden of rebutting the defendant's sanity
defense); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910) (remanding to determine whether the defendant had the will to control his body and comprehend the nature and quality of his actions). The
following articles discuss the insanity defense in detail. See generally Peter Arenella, Reflections on
Current Proposalsto Abolish or Reform the Insanity Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 (1982) (After
the acquittal of John W. Hinkley, Jr., Congress considered several bills to abolish or reform the
federal insanity defense. The article is Professor Aranella's testimony before the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.); Donald H.J. Hermann, Assault on the Insanity
Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RUTGERS L.J.
241, 244 (1983) ('This article undertakes an examination of the principal changes in the rules governing the use and effect of the insanity defense."); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally
Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 497 (1985)
("Redefining the insanity defense, carefully structuring the commitment process for insanity acquittees, and ensuring treatment for those found guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity would more
directly and effectively, address the concerns underlying the current attraction toward the guilty but
mentally ill verdict.").
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have on the motivations of the police who made the stop. Though not a
definitive answer to a complex task, a psycholegal approach could be a
starting point to assist a defendant in demonstrating the stop was racebased. If courts were more willing to consider the work of psychologists,
fact finders could determine how an officer schematically organizes
mental files, past experiences, and stereotypes. When the officer detains,
frisks, and/or arrests someone because of racial bias, lawyers and judges
should have tools to assess the subjective motivations of the officer. With
proper training, lawyers could develop skills to "identify and counteract
biases and prejudices ... that would otherwise interfere with their ability
to reach reliable verdicts." 188 Furthermore, lawyer-psychologist collaboration could enable lawyers to "gather more reliable evidence before
trial, more effectively identify and eliminate biased jurors during voir
dire, reduce the biasing effect of evidence presented during trial, and
present clearer and more understandable arguments.' 89
Courts should permit and encourage the consideration of subjective
motivations of officers who search, seize, or stop and frisk suspects. The
analysis should not only consist of what a reasonable person, or experienced officer, would do under the fact-specific circumstances. An analysis of the psychological, schematic nature of the officer's suspicion
would include an exploration of the officer's background knowledge of
and experience with the detainee's race. Collaboration with cognitive
psychologists would be appropriate to develop a research-based line of
questioning to effectively assess the officer's previous experiences that
contribute to racially motivated action. This information could assist a
detainee in undermining the reasonable, articulable suspicion for a
Fourth Amendment claim.
The approach should not be entertained to deceive the officer with
psychological jargon, or to manipulate or damage otherwise honorable
and just police work. Nor would the examination be an overblown, inefficient psychoanalysis of a witness. Rather, a psycholegal approach
would be a natural extension of the common sense, objective standard
approach currently employed by courts under Terry. At the same time, if
courts would permit it, lawyers might train with and learn from psychologists in order to develop more precise methods to evaluate an officer's behavior, as Justice Rehnquist suggested was lacking in Wardlow.

188.
J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741,775 (1987).
189. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Inner-city distrust of police is both ingrained and justified by repeated occasions of unjustified stops. Terry allows police officers to
make these stops based on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard than
probable cause. Wardlow is a modem application of the Terry doctrine,
which permitted officers to stop and search an individual in a high-crime
neighborhood because he made eye contact with an officer and fled.
Fleeing from police when there is a deep-rooted distrust of law enforcement does not support the requisite reasonable suspicion required to stop
and frisk a suspect.
Police will continue to make unjustified stops and courts will continue to permit them unless the issue of race is brought to the forefront. It
is not surprising that the majority opinion of Wardlow made no reference
to race as a factor to be considered in light of the officer's reasonable
suspicion, because society-at-large is uncomfortable with confronting
racial biases. The dissent suggested that race could be a component of
the totality of the circumstances, yet stopped short of applying race explicitly to the facts. Courts should allow race to be a factor in Fourth
Amendment analyses instead of reserving the discussion solely for equal
protection claims. One approach would be to consider the character of
the neighborhood in determining whether an individual's behavior is out
of the ordinary among law-abiding citizens. Another would be to permit
an examination of whether an officer stopped a suspect based on reasonable, articulable suspicion or racial bias. Until schematic categorizations
become a part of a court's assessment of an officer's motivations, on
occasion police will continue to intentionally or unintentionally act on
suspicions of race based on personal experience. This will only exacerbate the distrust between inner-city residents and the police, because
citizens will continue to be stopped in high-crime areas simply because
they are minorities.
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